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Abstract
This review considers some important landmarks in animal evolution, asking to what extent 
specialized action selection mechanisms play a role in the functional architecture of different 
nervous system plans, and looking for ‘forced moves’ or ‘good tricks’ (Dennett, 1995) that 
could possibly transfer to the design of robot control systems. A key conclusion is that while 
cnidarians (e.g. jellyfish) appear to have discovered some good tricks for the design of 
behavior-based control systems—largely lacking specialized selection mechanisms; the 
emergence of bilaterians may have forced the evolution of a central ganglion, or ‘archaic 
brain’, whose main function is to resolve conflicts between peripheral systems. Whilst 
vertebrates have many interesting selection substrates it is likely that here too, the evolution of 
centralized structures such as the medial reticular formation and the basal ganglia may have 
been a forced move due to the need to limit connection costs as brains increased in size.
Keywords: action selection, nervous system evolution, design space, computational 
neuroscience, behavior-based robots, Precambrian trace fossils.
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1 Introduction
Action selection is the task of resolving conflicts between competing behavioral alternatives. 
This problem has received considerable attention in the adaptive behavior literature (see Maes, 
1995; Prescott, Redgrave, & Gurney, 1999; Prescott, Bryson, & Seth, In Press) building, in 
part, on earlier research in ethology (e.g. McFarland, 1971, 1989) and neuroethology (e.g. 
Davis, 1979; Kristan & Shaw, 1997; Kupfermann & Weiss, 2001) where it is also described as 
the task of ‘decision making’, ‘behavioral choice’, or ‘motor program selection’. Whichever 
label is used, it is useful to recognize at the outset that the problem of selecting actions is really 
part of a wider problem faced by any complete creature, that of behavioral integration—
“the phenomenon so very characteristic of living organisms, and so very difficult to analyze: the 
fact that they behave as wholes rather than as the sum of their constituent parts. Their behavior 
shows integration, […] a process unifying the actions of an organism into patterns that involve 
the whole individual.” (Barrington, 1967, p. 415)
In discussing control systems for mobile robots, Brooks (1994) has emphasized a similar notion 
of behavioral coherence which he places at the centre of the problem of autonomous agent 
design. As robots have become more complex, they have naturally gained an increasing variety 
of actuator sub-systems, many of which can act in parallel.  Controlling robots therefore 
requires the co-ordination, in space and time, of many interacting sub-systems, and the 
allocation of appropriate resources between them. The problem for control system design is to 
satisfy these multiple constraints in a manner that maintains the global coherence of the robot’s 
behavior. Given this context, Brooks raised the concern that research directed at the more 
specific problem of action selection may not lead to automatic progress in the design of 
systems with behavioral coherence. It may be the case, for instance, that proposed action 
selection mechanisms will not scale-up to the task of controlling more complex robots; or, that 
effective action selection will come to be seen as a consequence of maintaining behavioral 
coherence, rather than as a key element involved in creating it.
What concerns us here, of course, is the question of the decomposition of control, also 
known as the ‘problem of architecture’. Will an effective robot controller have components 
whose role is recognizably to resolve conflicts between different action sub-systems? Or, is 
action selection better regarded as an emergent property—the consequence of many and diverse 
interactions between multiple sub-systems? (and, in this sense, not something to be considered 
in isolation from other aspects of control). If effective integration is emergent then research on 
the design of action selection mechanisms per se may lead to a dead-end. On the other hand, if 
action selection or other related aspects of behavioral integration, can be implemented in 
specialized system components, then some of the advantages of modularity may accrue to the 
whole design process. Specifically, it may be possible to add/delete/modify different action 
sub-systems with less concern for the possibility of adverse, system-wide consequences for the 
maintenance of behavioral coherence.1
How are we to decide answers to these questions?  The strategy in this article is to 
attempt a brief survey of some relevant characteristics in the design of natural control systems 
for complete creatures—animal nervous systems. The focus will be on those aspects of the 
functional architecture of nervous systems that seem to play an important role in action 
                                                     
1
 A full discussion of the pros and cons of emergent and specialized action selection, particular with respect to 
the notion of modularity, is given in Prescott et al. (1999).
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selection, or, more broadly, in behavioral integration. In particular, I will look for evidence of 
structures that are specialized to resolve conflicts and that seem to have this as their primary 
function. The absence of such structures would favor the view that action selection is most 
often the emergent consequence of the interaction of sub-system elements concerned with 
wider or different aspects of control. Such findings might encourage the pursuit of similar, 
distributed solutions to the coordination of complex robot control systems. The presence of 
candidate structures, on the other hand, would favor the view that complex control architectures 
can have a natural decomposition into components concerned with the sensorimotor control of 
action, and those concerned with the selection of action. Such findings would suggest a similar 
strategy for the decomposition of robot control. To anticipate the argument somewhat, I will be 
making the case that nervous system evolution does show evidence of specialized action 
selection mechanisms in some complex natural control systems.
The approach taken here is also an evolutionary one in that I will specifically consider 
animal nervous systems at three different and important grades in the evolution of complex 
metazoans (multicellular animals). To place what follows in this evolutionary context, figure 1 
shows a phylogeny of the major metazoan phyla illustrating some of the principle early events 
in the evolution of animal body plans and nervous systems.  
Figure 1.  Phylogeny of early metazoans (based on Adoutte et al., 2000; Erwin & Davidson, 2002).  
Node 1 represents the emergence of multicellularity in aneural, ‘colonial’ creatures similar to modern 
day sponges (poriferans). Node 2 marks the appearance of animals with radial symmetry, differentiated 
cell types, and nerve nets, as exemplified by living cnidarians.  Node 3 indicates the emergence of 
bilaterality along with a more centralized nervous system. Finally, node 4 marks the appearance, within 
the chordate phylum, of the first craniate ancestors of modern vertebrates.
From the perspective of this article, the first event of particular note is the evolution 
(node 2 in the figure) of neurons and nerve nets in animals similar to those of the extant 
phylum Cnidaria. This phylum includes a host of mostly simple, but also very intriguing 
animals such as jellyfish, sea anemones, corals, and hydrozoans (e.g. Hydra). These differ from 
the most primitive metazoans (Porifera–sponges), in that they possess a variety of different 
tissue types; generally possess a radial symmetry; may have simple sensory organs; and have 
nervous systems composed of networks of nerve cells. Fossil evidence suggests that cnidarians 
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were present during the Ediacaran period (635 to 542 mya)2 at the end of Neoproterozoic era, 
and are likely to have been the first animals to evolve nervous systems of any kind. There is 
still a great deal to be learned about the functional architecture of cnidarian nervous systems, 
however, existing research does provide a number of very interesting pointers. Some of this 
evidence is reviewed in section 2 below.
The next event, node 3, separates the bilateral animals from the other metazoan phyla. 
All modern bilaterians possess internal organs, a central nervous system, and a ‘brain’ formed 
by an aggregation of neurons towards the anterior end of the animal. On the basis of recent 
molecular sequencing analyses (see, e.g. Adoutte et al., 2000) it is now thought that the 
bilaterians divided, at an early stage, into two groups or ‘superphyla’—the protostomes and the 
deuterostomes. Interestingly, this evolutionary split separates the vertebrates (who belong to the 
deuterostome chordates) from the protostome invertebrate phyla with more complex nervous 
systems—arthropods (which includes insects) and mollusks (which includes cephalopods such 
as the octopi). Of the deuterostomes, in fact, vertebrates are the only animals with highly-
developed brains, although the echinoderms—such as sea urchins, and starfish—with their 
pentameral (five-sided) symmetry present some interesting problems (and solutions) in control 
system design! 
Fossil evidence shows a remarkable explosion of animal forms during the Cambrian 
period (544–488 mya) in which all of the major bilaterian phyla were represented, despite 
being absent, for the most part, from the fossil record at the end of the Ediacaran. This evidence 
implies a rapid evolution of complex nervous systems, as part of the general evolution of new 
body plans (Gabor  Miklos, Campbell, & Kankel, 1994); it also indicates that the deuterostome-
protostome split predates the Cambrian boundary by some margin. Current hypotheses 
concerning the last common ancestor of all extant bilaterian groups—the Urbilateria—suggest 
it was a creature with an anterior-posterior axis, two-ended gut, internal organs, and simple 
nervous and sensory systems (Baguna et al., 2001; Erwin & Davidson, 2002). More 
controversially this creature may have had an internal body cavity (coelum), and possibly some 
simple tentacle-like appendages (Knoll & Carroll, 1999). Genetically, the Urbilateria is thought 
to have possessed the “essential bilaterian toolbox” (Erin and Davidson, 2002) of regulatory 
genes, such as the Hox gene cluster, that underlie cell differentiation and body patterning in 
modern bilaterians.  Animals that might fit this description are known to have been dwelling on 
the sea floor towards the end of the Ediacaran as demonstrated by the large number of trace 
fossils that have preserved their behavior (e.g. foraging trails) though not their body forms 
(Crimes & Anderson, 1985; Crimes, 1992; Valentine, 1994). Simulation of these trace fossil 
patterns indicates a capacity for coordinated behavior not unlike that demonstrated in some 
simple behavior-based robots (Prescott & Ibbotson, 1997). Section 3 considers some insights 
into the functional architecture of Ediacaran trace-makers that have been developed through 
computational modeling. While section 4 reviews neurobiological research on some of the 
simpler living protostomes (free-living flatworms) whose morphology and nervous system may 
provide insight into those of the early bilaterians and into the evolutionary origins of the first 
brains.
Node 4 in figure 1 marks the beginning of a further momentous phase—the evolution 
within the chordates of the first craniates—creatures with a well-developed head and skull, 
ancestral to all extant vertebrates. Until relatively recently there were no uncontroversial 
craniate fossils of earlier origin than the Ordovician period (488–444 mya), implying that 
                                                     
2 Dating is from the International Commission on Stratigraphy (http://www.stratigraphy.org/), mya= million 
years ago.  Note that the Ediacaran is also sometimes referred to as the Vendian period.
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vertebrates appeared somewhat later than the general explosion of bilaterians. However, finds 
from Chengjiang in China (the Chinese ‘Burgess shale’) show the presence of fish-like 
creatures in the early Cambrian (Shu, Luo, & Conway Morris, 1999; Mallatt & Chen, 2003)—
between twenty and fifty million years earlier than was previously thought.  Evidence from 
comparative neurobiology (see Prescott et al., 1999 for review) suggests the conservation, 
through evolution, of a basic vertebrate brain plan that may have been present in early jawless 
fish (see also Gabor Miklos, 1994; Northcutt, 2002). Taken together, this suggests that the first 
vertebrate nervous systems may be as ancient as many of those of the protostome bilaterian 
phyla. Section 5 considers a number of aspects of the functional architecture of vertebrate 
brains relevant to the problem action selection. This section also briefly outlines some recent 
efforts to develop computational and robotic models of centralized vertebrate brain structures 
that play a critical role in action selection and behavioral integration.
Finally, section 6 summarizes this review of the evolution of action selection mechanisms 
in animal nervous systems and looks for implications that could inspire the design of control 
architectures for autonomous robots. What exactly do we expect to find? The hope is that the 
study of comparative neurobiology will uncover evidence of what Dennett (1995) calls ‘forced 
moves’ in evolutionary design space, that is, outcomes imposed by strong task constraints; or 
‘good tricks’—robust and relatively general solutions to common problems, either of which 
could be usefully transferred into the design space for autonomous mobile beings.
2 Cnidarian nervous systems
Whilst the most primitive metazoans, the sponges, lack neurons and respond only to direct 
stimulation (usually with a very slow, spreading contraction), cnidarians have quite complex 
nervous systems, composed, for the most part, of distributed nerve nets, and show both 
internally generated rhythmic behavior, and coordinated patterns of motor response to complex 
sensory stimuli. 
The basic cnidarian nerve net is a two-dimensional network of neurons that has both a 
sensory and a motor capacity, and in which there is no distinction between axons and 
dendrites—nervous impulses therefore propagate in both directions between cells (Mackie, 
1990). According to Horridge (1968), in the most primitive nerve nets “the spatial pattern is 
irrelevant, the connectivity pattern has no restrictions. […] any fiber is equivalent to any other 
in either growth or transmission” (p. 26). 
The lack of intermediary forms of nervous system organization between the aneural 
sponges and the cnidarian nerve net means that the evolutionary origin of nerve nets, and of 
nervous tissue in general, is shrouded in mystery. It seems likely, however, that neural 
conduction was preceded by more primitive forms of communication in which signals were 
propagated directly between neighboring cells (indeed this form of non-neural communication 
exists alongside neural conduction in some cnidarians—Josephson, 1974; Mackie, 2004b). The 
evolution of the nerve net can then be understood as facilitating more rapid and more specific 
communication over longer distances, which would allow both quicker responses and increased 
functional diversification between different cell groups (Horridge, 1968; Mackie, 1990).3 Most 
of the neurophysiological features of more ‘advanced’ metazoan nervous systems are actually 
present at the cnidarian grade including multifunctional neurons, action potentials, synapses,
                                                     
3Some of the likely benefits of neural conduction have been demonstrated in a computational model of cnidarian 
evolution developed by Albert (1999).
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and chemical neurotransmission. For Grimmelikhuijzen and Westfall (1995) the existence of 
such features shows cnidarians to be “near the main line” of evolution, and suggests that the 
study of their nervous systems will illuminate some of the properties of nervous systems 
ancestral to the higher metazoans.
The nervous systems of extant cnidarians are, in fact, more sophisticated than the 
above characterization of simple nerve nets indicates. For instance, Hydra, one of the simpler  
living cnidarians, has a variety of different neuronal cell-types, and while most belong to 
diffuse networks, some are found in localized, well-defined bundles that may have specific 
functional roles (Josephson & Mackie, 1965; Mackie, 1990). In other cnidarians, such as the 
hydrozoan jellyfish, parts of the nerve net are fused to form longitudinal or circular tracts that 
allow very fast signal conduction and can support fast attack or escape reactions. Many of the 
free-living cnidarians also possess light-sensitive and gravity-sensitive organs that allow 
behaviors such as orientation, sun compass navigation, and daily migration (see, e.g. Hamner, 
1995); unfortunately, for most animals, the neural substrate that supports such behaviors 
remains poorly understood.
What is known about the functional architecture of cnidarian nervous systems? 
Pioneering research by Romanes (1885), extended by Horridge (1956; 1968), described the 
decomposition of the nervous system of the scyphozoan jellyfish Aurelia aurita into two 
distinct components: a network of bipolar neurons that controls the symmetrical, pulsed 
contraction of the bell and enables the animal to swim; and a second, more diffuse network, 
consisting largely of small multipolar neurons, that is spread across the body, tentacles, and 
margins of the animal, and coordinates localized feeding movements. These two systems, 
which are illustrated in figure 2 for the larva of Aurelia aurita, have relatively few 
interconnections and show clear evidence of independent operation. A similar functional 
subdivision of the nerve net into two or more parts has also been noted in a variety of other 
cnidarians such as sea anemones. This behavioral decomposition of control, with physically 
distinct circuits for feeding and movement, clearly shows an interesting similarity to that 
proposed for behavior-based robots (see, e.g. (Brooks, 1991; Mataric, 1997). 
Figure 2. Nervous system of the ephyra larva of Aurelia aurita, showing, in two arms of the bell, a) the 
swimming network controlling the circular, and radial muscles; b) the diffuse nerve-net underlying 
feeding behavior. A rhopalium (or marginal ganglion) is located at the base of each tentaculocyst. From 
Horridge (1956). (Reprinted with permission from the Company of Biologists Ltd.)
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The question arises, however, are alternative decompositions of the nervous system 
possible? Meech (1989) describes a hydrozoan jellyfish, Aglantha digitale, in which the giant 
motor axons innervating its swimming muscles can carry two different types of action 
potentials enabling either rapid escape swimming, or, slow rhythmic swimming for feeding. 
Similarly, the sea anemone Actinia, uses impulse patterns of different frequency to obtain 
distinct feeding and escape behaviors from a single nerve net (Mackie, 1990). Thus, there 
seems to be no strong requirement for distinct neural substrates for different classes of behavior 
in these animals. 
The radial shape and relative lack of centralized nervous system components in 
cnidarians also leads to some interesting and elegant solutions to the problem of generating an 
integrated global response. For instance, consider the fast escape behavior that can be triggered 
in some hydromedusan jellyfish by contact at any point on the periphery of the animal. Since 
jellyfish swim by the synchronous, simultaneous contraction of the entire perimeter of the bell, 
the lack of centralized signaling presents an interesting control problem for which Mackie 
(1990) describes two contrasting solutions. One solution, seen in Aglantha, uses giant axons 
with very fast conductance so that a single spike can circumnavigate the periphery in just a few 
milliseconds. An alternative and perhaps more remarkable solution, seen in the much larger 
species Polyorchis, involves a network of neurons (the Swimming Motor Neurons) that carries 
action potentials that change shape as they circle the bell. Successive muscles groups respond 
to these changing shapes by contracting at shorter and shorter latencies, thus ensuring a 
uniform and synchronized contraction of the whole perimeter. This elegant solution appears to 
depend solely on membrane-level properties of the neurons involved (Spencer, Przysiezniak, & 
Acosta-Urquidi, 1989). 
According to Horridge (1956) (see also Satterlie, 2002) the two functionally distinct 
nerve nets of Aurelia aurita make contact with one another in eight neuron clusters termed the 
marginal ganglia or rhopalia. Each rhopalium is part of the swimming network and is involved 
in the regular beat of the swimming contraction; it can also generate its own regular pulse if 
isolated from other parts of the network (thus showing an intrinsic rhythm generating capacity). 
Each rhopalium is also in contact with the diffuse network that underlies the feeding response. 
Excitation in the diffuse network can inhibit the swimming rhythm or, in some cases, accelerate 
the rhythm. This evidence suggests a hierarchical arrangement: pattern formation (the 
swimming beat) seems to be under the distributed control of multiple pacemaker systems (see 
Satterlie, 2002, for a discussion of how they interact), whilst the behavior of this swimming 
network is under the modulatory control of the diffuse feeding network. If this is the case, then 
this jellyfish nervous system could be viewed as providing a natural example of a subsumption 
architecture4 (Brooks, 1986) composed of two distributed layers of control. 
In Aglantha digitale, which is thought to have the most complex neural circuitry of 
known Cnidaria, twelve distinct neuronal circuits and two epithelial (cell-to-cell) conduction 
systems have been identified (Mackie, 2004a). Interestingly, as this animal (and other 
hydromedusan jellies) evolved from a creature with a more distributed wiring plan, a form of 
centralization has occurred with much of the neural circuitry becoming compressed into two 
marginal, nerve rings that have thus taken on some of the characteristics of a central nervous 
                                                     
4 A subsumption architecture is one in which control is decomposed into distinct layers where higher layers are 
able to modulate the outputs of lower ones (e.g. by adjusting gain), or replace the outputs of lower layers with their 
own signals.  When a higher layer of control is removed of damaged the lower layers are still able to function, 
however, the reverse is not true; competencies implemented by higher layers rely on the integrity of lower ones in 
order to function (see Brooks, 1986; Prescott et al., 1999 for further explanation).
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system (Satterlie, 2002; Mackie, 2004a). Much is now known about the functional roles of each 
of the control sub-systems and their interactions (Mackie & Meech, 2000; Meech & Mackie, 
2001), making this animal an enticing prospect for future computational modeling. From the 
perspective of this review the following features are of particular note. First, the circuitry 
underlying slow swimming and fast escape share some common neural substrates (e.g. the 
giant motor axons noted above), but also have some distinct elements. For instance, slow 
swimming involves a network of “pacemaker” neurons in the inner ring cord that, in addition to 
generating the swimming rhythm, help to induce slow regular contractions in the tentacles via a 
circuit known as the “relay system”. Escape, on the other hand, involves a network of “ring 
giant” neurons in the outer nerve ring in which activation can be triggered by deflection of 
sensitive hair cells. This system can initiate rapid contraction of the tentacles to accompany the 
fast swimming response. However, these two circuits also interact, such that, for instance, 
activity in the pacemaker and relay systems can initiate spiking in the ring giant that will cause 
escape-like, rapid tentacle contraction during slow swimming.  The uniformity of the ring nerve 
system as it circumnavigates the bell, and the existence of many substrates that allow 
interactions between the underlying circuits, indicate that there is no specialized substrate for 
action selection in this animal. The fast escape circuit clearly has the ability to override regular 
swimming, however, the capacity of the latter to co-opt escape circuitry for its own uses means 
there is a comparatively complex mapping from the functional architecture of this animal to the 
underlying neural substrate.
Aurelia and Aglantha provide contrasting examples of jellyfish control systems that to 
some extent typify the scyphomedusan and hydromedusan groups to which they belong 
(Satterlie, 2002). A third group, the cubomedusans (or box jellyfish), are also worth noting. 
Like the scyphomedusans these animals have distinct ganglia (rhopalia) that generate the 
swimming pattern, though the number of these structures is reduced to just four; however, like 
the hydromedusans the box jellies also have a condensed nerve ring that directly connect the 
rhopalia together—presumably allowing for faster, targeted transmission (Satterlie, 2002). The 
rhopalia themselves are also comparatively complex in that each carries four ‘eyes’, two of 
which include both a lens and a retina and that are probably capable of some form of spatial 
vision (Nilsson, Gislen, Coates, Skogh, & Garm, 2005). The cubomedusae are known to be 
agile swimmers, that may actively pursue prey, and the rhopalia, as pacemakers, appear to 
interact in a more complex and semi-independent manner than in other jellyfish allowing 
asymmetrical contractions that provide increased maneuverability (Satterlie & Nolen, 2001). 
In sum, cnidarian nervous systems demonstrate the ability of relatively simple nerve 
networks to support multiple behavioral modes, in some cases, using the same neural structures 
to generate two quite different patterns of activity. Behavioral decomposition of function seems 
to be significant trait in simpler animals, and the distributed nature of many cnidarian nervous 
systems would seem to make them a good preparation in which to study behavioral integration 
as a more global property of the control system architecture. At the same time, however, the 
condensation of nerve nets into nerve rings in both hydro- and cubo- medusae, and the 
reduction of the number of rhopalia in the latter5, would suggest that even in radially symmetric 
creatures, enhanced behavioral complexity requires a degree of centralization of control. This 
trend would appear, then, to have the characteristics of one of Dennett’s “forced moves”. 
Indeed, Satterlie, referring to the shared characteristics of hydrozoan and cubozoan swim 
systems, expresses a similar thought—“hydrozoan-like specializations [including the presence 
                                                     
5 Satterlie (2002) discusses comparative data suggesting that both nerve rings and the reduced number of 
rhopalia in cubomedusans are derived features rather than primitive cnidarian traits.
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of the ring nerve] may well be examples of convergence of traits that are essential to highly 
efficient, directed locomotion” (Satterlie, 2002, p. 1666).
3 Robot modeling of the behavior of early bilaterians
As noted above, the common ancestor of all modern, bilaterally symmetric animals, was 
probably a bottom-dwelling creature, living in a shallow marine environment during the mid-
to late- Ediacaran period. Such animals, along with many of the early bilaterians (worms, 
mollusks, and arthropods) they gave rise to, will have left no or few actual fossils as they had 
virtually no hard body-parts. Fortunately, however, they did leave a fossil record of sorts—the 
tracks, trails, and burrows of many early invertebrates have been preserved forming what are 
now called trace fossils. The earliest foraging trails, which are sometimes called ‘scribbles’, 
show tracks that often cross themselves, and indicate relatively crude foraging strategies. By 
the end of the Ediacaran, however, more regular foraging patterns were appearing that formed 
spiral fossils or ‘meandering’ trails that loop back on themselves without crossing (Crimes & 
Anderson, 1985; Crimes, 1992). One such fossilized meander is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3. An Ediacaran meandering trace fossil (Crimes & Anderson, 1985). Reprinted with permission 
from SEPM (The Society for Sedimentary Geology).
In attempting to infer the behavioral capabilities of the ancient animals that left these fossil 
traces, it seems reasonable to seek the simplest mechanisms that will reproduce the observed 
patterns. In 1969, the geologists Raup and Seilacher published an article demonstrating that 
computer simulations of meandering trace fossil patterns could be created by combining a 
number of simple reactive behaviors: thigmotaxis, stay close to previously formed tracks; 
phobotaxis, avoid crossing existing tracks; strophotaxis  make 180° turns at various intervals; 
and move forward (advance) when the conditions of the other behaviors are not met. The 
principle of a complex behavior pattern emerging from the interaction of a number of simple 
reactions is a characteristic that this early work in computer modeling clearly shares with the 
'behavior-based' approach in robotics. Indeed, Raup and Seilacher’s meander generator bears 
striking similarities to many of the 'wall-following' mechanisms that have been used in the 
control of behavior-based robots. For instance, Mataric (1990) describes a robust wall-
following behavior that emerges from the interaction of three modules. The first, similar to 
thigmotaxis, causes the robot to steer inwards (toward the wall) when sensors indicate that the 
distance to the wall is above some threshold; the second, similar to phobotaxis, causes the robot 
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to steer outwards when the sensed distance is below a threshold; while, the third, causes the 
robot to move forward whenever the conditions of the other two behaviors are not met. 
This fascinating intersection between evolutionary biology and robotics inspired Carl 
Ibbotson and I to make our own investigations into robot trace-making behavior using a 
custom-built robot that could generate and follow trails across the laboratory floor (Prescott and 
Ibbotson, 1997). The sediment feeders of the Precambrian probably used chemical and 
mechanical sensory systems to detect and follow their tracks and burrows, however, as a (very) 
loose approximation to these mechanisms our robot used light sensors to detect a trail of paper 
which was dispensed by the robot as it moved across the laboratory floor. Figure 4 shows how 
the different component reactions required for (paper) trail-making can be easily implemented 
by a robot. 
Figure 4. Implementing trail-making behavior in a robot. The robot has two arms (right and left) each 
carrying two light sensors (LDRs) and two motors (right and left). Phobotaxis (left), a turn away from 
the sensor arm, is triggered when the value of the inner LDR sensor is greater than a threshold set 
slightly above the reflectance of the dark floor surface. Thigmotaxis (center), a turn towards the sensor 
arm, is triggered when the value of the outer LDR sensor is less than a threshold set slightly below the 
reflectance of the light-colored paper dispensed by the robot. In both cases the required turn is achieved 
by rotating the drive wheel on the outside of the turn forwards, and that on the inside of the turn in 
reverse. For the advance behavior (right) the robot moves forward on a trajectory that drifts inwards 
towards the sensor arm. (From Prescott & Ibbotson, 1997).
The three behaviors illustrated in figure 4—phobotaxis, thigmotaxis, and advance—are 
sufficient to generate a spiraling trail provided two action selection issues are addressed. 
First, the phobotaxis behavior should take priority over thigmotaxis when the sensory 
pre-conditions for both behaviors are met as this will prevent the robot from re-crossing a 
narrow section of its early path. Indeed, based on their study of different forms of trace fossil 
meander, Raup and Seilacher argued that thigmotaxis and phobotaxis were "genetically distinct 
behavioral reactions". Following this precedent, the elements of the robot control system were 
conceived of as distinct competencies, arranged in a subsumption-like hierarchy, with 
phobotaxis able to suppress thigmotaxis which, in turn, suppresses advance (see Figure 6 
below). 
Second, the robot should be controlled by just one of its two sensor arms—the robot 
will then spiral in the direction of that arm; otherwise, with both arms active, the two sides 
would send conflicting signals to the motors causing the robot to move off-course. The control
architecture must therefore select a dominant side and suppress motor control signals arising 
from the opposite side. 
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In order to generate a meandering trail, that is one containing U-turns, an additional 
strophotaxis mechanism is needed that will swap control of the robot from one sensor arm to 
the other at appropriate moments. Figure 5 shows the meandering trail generated by a robot that 
uses ‘time outs’ to control strophotaxis, in other words, control is swapped between the two 
sides of the robot at fixed time intervals6. Figure 6 illustrates the functional architecture, just 
described, for the embedded controller. A behavioral hierarchy is implemented on each side of 
the robot to control responses to local sensory signals, while strophotaxis sub-systems bridge 
the robot ‘midline’ in order to regulate which side has control of the motors at any given time.
Figure 5. A robot meander. Control is passed from one side of the robot to the other every thirty 
seconds. As soon as control is swapped from one side to the other, the self-correcting nature of the 
thigmotaxis/phobotaxis reactions causes the robot to turn until contact is regained with the trail on the 
opposite side. Hence, the U-turn itself is not explicitly programmed.  Note also the ‘starter spiral’ which 
is the result of ‘trail following’ where there is no initial trail to follow.  Similar starter spirals are seen in 
many meandering trace fossils. (Photograph from Prescott & Ibbotson, 1997).
The functional architecture just described for the robot meander, suggests that 
sensorimotor control in early bilaterians may have also combined reactive systems capable of 
responding to local (unilateral) stimuli, with control elements that act more globally in 
determining the behavioral strategy of the whole organism. I will return to the question of what 
this might imply about the substrate for behavioral integration in these animals after 
considering some potentially relevant clues from invertebrate neurobiology.
                                                     
6
 See Prescott and Ibbotson (1997) for a discussion of the likely triggers for strophotaxis events in trace fossil 
meanders. 
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Figure 6: An architecture for generating meandering trails. The functional sub-systems for trail-making 
are arranged in two unilateral hierarchies that generate motor signals targeting a shared set of motors. 
The strophotaxis sub-systems provide communication and arbitration between the two sides of the robot, 
switching control of the motors from one side to the other at regular time intervals, and preventing the 
outputs of the non-active side from reaching the motor resource. (From Prescott and Ibbotson, 1997).
4 Flatworm nervous systems
In the evolution of bilateral animals a critical development was the appearance of a central 
nervous system organized around a massed concentration of nerve cells called the cephalic 
ganglion, or ‘archaic brain’. In flatworms—animals of the phylum platyhelminthes—we find 
the simplest living animals that possess this form of nervous system architecture (Reuter, 1989; 
Reuter & Gustafsson, 1995). 
Traditional phylogenies placed platyhelminthes as the start of the bilateral radiation as a 
stem phylum from which both the protostome and deuterostome groups later evolved.  Recent 
molecular analyses have, however, generated a rather more complex picture.  Specifically, it is 
now thought that the majority of flatworm classes belong within the protostome group and 
therefore have no special claim to be representative of the first bilaterians (Adoutte et al., 
2000). On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that a sub-group of 
platyhelminthes—the acoel flatworms (Acoela)—are sufficiently distinct from other 
protostomes as to be a possible ‘sister group’ to the bilaterians and therefore an important 
source of insights into the likely characteristics of a common ancestor (Ruiz-Trillo, Riutort, 
Littlewood, Herniou, & Baguna, 1999; Baguna & Riutort, 2004; Ruiz-Trillo, Riutort, Fourcade, 
Baguna, & Boore, 2004). Indeed, the acoels, may be somewhat simpler than the Urbilateria, 
based on estimates of the morphology of that creature, reflecting the fact that bilaterality, as a 
trait, will likely have appeared some time earlier than the protostome-deuterostome divergence 
(Knoll & Carroll, 1999). Whilst the debate about the status of the Acoela has yet to be fully 
resolved7 it remains the case that flatworms are, morphologically, among the simplest bilaterian 
                                                     
7
 Adoutte and colleagues (Adoutte et al., 2000; Balavoine, de Rosa, & Adoutte, 2002) have proposed a contrary 
view that includes the acoels within the protostome group, rather than as a sister group to the bilaterians.
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animals and that therefore an investigation of their neurobiology could provide useful insights 
into the early evolution of bilateral nervous systems.  Unfortunately, although the acoels may 
be the most primitive of the flatworms, the literature on their neurobiology is limited and 
mostly confined to anatomical studies. One significant conclusion that has been drawn from the 
available data is that the cephalic ganglia of acoels are surprisingly varied: a finding that 
suggests that primitive brains may have evolved from undifferentiated nerve nets on a number 
of separate occasions (Raikova et al., 2004). Given the lack of functional studies in the acoel 
flatworms, I will look here at findings from another group of free-living flatworms—the 
polyclad turbellarians—in order to gain some insights into the relationship between brain and 
behavior in animals of flatworm grade. Although probably belonging to different phyla, it has 
been noted that acoels and turbellarians share similarities in the ways their nervous systems 
have evolved (Raikova et al., 2004).  Such convergences imply that similar constraints may be 
at work, leading to the possibility of uncovering a further “forced move”. 
Turbellarian flatworms range in size from a few millimeters to tens of centimeters. They 
are found in aquatic environments or moist terrestrial environments where most pursue a 
predatory or scavenging life-style requiring a repertoire of reasonably complex behaviors. Like 
other bilaterians, these animals have distinct anterior and posterior ends, and dorsal (upper) and 
ventral (lower) surfaces. Sensory systems are distributed symmetrically between the left and 
right sides of the body, but together with the nervous system often show a concentration, 
termed cephalization, towards the anterior end of the body. Turbellarian nervous systems (like 
the acoels) appear in a bewildering variety of different configurations, none of which can 
necessarily be considered primitive (Reuter, 1989). Typically, there are three to five pairs of 
major nerve cords connecting with the cephalic ganglion (see, e.g. figure 7). These cords are 
interlinked by circular commissures (bands of nerve fibers), which themselves make 
connections with networks (plexuses) of nerves underlying muscular and/or epithelial tissue. 
The cell bodies of sensory neurons are found near the periphery while those of motor neurons 
and interneurons are distributed throughout the nerve cords and the brain. The concentration of 
nerve cells into cords, fibers, and ganglia distinguishes this type of central nervous system from 
the nerve nets of the simpler cnidarians. The following discussion of the functional architecture 
of the flatworm nervous system follows the research of Gruber and Ewer (1962) and of 
Koopowitz and co-workers (Koopowitz, 1970; Koopowitz, Silver, & Rose, 1975; Koopowitz, 
Silver, & Rose, 1976; Koopowitz & Keenan, 1982; Koopowitz, 1986, 1989) that has focused 
on the role of the brain in marine polyclad turbellarians. 
Gruber and Ewer studied the effect of brain removal on the behavior of the polyclad 
Planocera gilchristi, whose nervous system is pictured in figure 7. This animal usually moves 
by swimming or crawling along the substrate. Swimming involves the generation of a 
transverse wave that moves backwards along the length of the body, while crawling involves a 
regular alternating extension of the two sides of the body. Following brain removal, Gruber and 
Ewer reported that components of both normal swimming and normal crawling were present in 
decerebrate worms but that these were never integrated into the normal sequences—the overall 
movement of the animal was irregular and uncoordinated. Similarly, decerebrates lacked a 
normal rapid righting response when placed in an inverted position, although they could 
eventually right themselves by making writhing and twisting movements. These animals also 
failed to display the normal retraction response to mechanical stimulation, again responding 
with an uncoordinated writhing.
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Figure 7. Nervous system of the turbellarian Planocera gilchristi, viewed from above, showing the brain 
(Br), pharynx (Ph), and major nerve cords (1V-VII). The anterior of the animal is towards the top of the 
picture. The finest granularity of nerve fibers is only shown in the central areas around the pharynx. 
From Gruber and Ewer (1962). (Reprinted with permission from the Company of Biologists Ltd.)
Gruber and Ewer also describe the effects of decerebration on the feeding behavior of 
Planocera. This behavior was the subject of further detailed investigation by Koopowitz (1970) 
who went on to examine decerebrate feeding in another marine polyclad—Notoplana aticola 
(Koopowitz et al. 1975, 1976). The behavior of Notoplana will be described as it is typical of 
the general pattern of results obtained with these animals. 
In the intact polyclad worm presentation of a food item near to its posterior margin will 
cause it to extend a nearby portion of that margin and use this to take hold of the food.  The 
animal will then rotate the anterior part of its body on that side, until the anterior margin comes 
into contact with the food. The posterior margin subsequently loosens its grip allowing the 
anterior edge to manipulate the food into the mouth. This sequence of behavior is shown in 
figure 8a. When fed with large food items (dead shrimps) the animal becomes satiated after a 
few food presentations and the feeding response ceases.
In the decerebrate animal, in contrast, the body turn to bring the anterior margin into 
contact with the food is never observed. Instead, the animal performs a ‘local feeding response’ 
in which it gradually moves the food directly to its mouth via the underside of its body (figure 
8b). In addition to the lack of a coordinated ‘whole body’ feeding response the decerebrate 
animals show no satiety and will continue passing food items towards the mouth even once the 
gut is completely full. Control experiments in which the brain remains intact but the main 
posterior nerves on one side of the body are severed, show feeding behavior characteristic of 
the normal animal on the intact side, and that characteristic of the decerebrate on the cut side.
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Figure 8. Feeding behavior of the polyclad Notoplana. A. In the intact animal contact with an item food 
at the posterior margin causes a whole body response in which the animal turns and grabs the food with 
its anterior edge before passing it to the central, ventrally located mouth.  B. In the decerebrate animal, a 
‘local feeding response’ causes food to be passed directly to the mouth. From Koopowitz and Keenan 
(1982). (Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Science.)
Overall, these experiments on decerebrate polyclad behavior demonstrate the role of the brain 
in regulating local reflexive actions whose neural substrate is located in the periphery of the 
animal.  In the case of crawling and swimming, the brain orders the temporal sequence of local 
activity in different marginal areas of body.  In the case of feeding, the brain holds the ‘local 
feeding response’ under inhibitory control whilst enabling actions involved in the ‘whole body’ 
feeding response. 
This centralized coordination of behavior seen in the polyclad stands in interesting 
contrast to the more distributed nature of control noted in cnidarians. What evolutionary 
pressures may have brought about such a change in the functional organization of nervous 
systems? Koopowitz and Keenan (1982) contrast two possible explanations for the evolution of 
the first brains. The first possibility is that the brain is one of several consequences of the 
process of cephalization—the aggregation of sensory systems in the anterior portion of the 
animal. According to this explanation, the co-ordination of peripheral mechanisms becomes 
focused in the brain in order to place it closer to the principle sources of afferent stimulation. 
This view also makes the primary role of the primitive brain one of response initiation. The 
alternative view, favored by Koopowitz and Keenan, is based on the observation that although 
all polyclads have brains, not all show significant cephalization.  Instead, the origin of the brain 
could be attributable to a more fundamental change in the body plan of the organism—the 
evolution of bilateral symmetry itself:
“We consider that the development of bilateral symmetry, rather than cephalization, was the 
prime feature that necessitated the evolution of the brain. Bilateral symmetry required that the 
right-hand side know what was happening on the left, and vice versa. In effect, with the advent 
of bilateral symmetry, the evolution of the brain was necessary for the coordination of disparate 
peripherally-based reflexes. This was of prime importance in preventing the two sides from 
engaging in contradictory activities.”  (Koopowitz and Keenan, 1982, p. 78)
From the perspective of this paper, this interesting proposal might be paraphrased as the 
hypothesis that the brain first evolved as a centralized substrate for action selection. While in 
the more ‘advanced’ Cnidaria there is evidence of the condensation of nerve nets into 
specialized neural control structures (such as the nerve rings); in flatworms the evolution of 
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dedicated conduction pathways (such as nerve cords) combines with an opportunity, denied to 
the bag-like jellies, of placing a coordinating center at a strategic position along the midline and 
towards the anterior end of the animal.
In anatomical studies of the polyclad brain, Koopowitz and colleagues (see Koopowitz, 
1986) were able to identify, by dye-staining, many decussating neurons—cells whose soma and 
dendritic trees were found in one half of the brain while their axons projected across the 
midline to peripheral targets on the other side of the body.  A subset of these neurons were also 
found to be electrotonically coupled with symmetrical cells on the opposite side of the midline 
(meaning that cell pairs will work in unison). Decussating neurons could provide a key element 
of the substrate for maintaining behavioral coherence between the two halves of the body: non-
coupled neurons acting, where required, to suppress or facilitate responses in the opposite 
body-half; coupled neurons operating when there is a need to ensure synchrony between the 
two sides.
Koopowitz and co-workers (1970, 1982, 1989) also describe further experiments in 
which half of the polyclad brain is excised, and the severed cephalic nerve cords allowed to 
regrow, re-establishing appropriate functional connections with the remaining half-brain. In 
other experiments the brain of one animal is transferred in its entirety into another’s body and 
once again re-exerts many of its original behavioral controls over the periphery. Finally, brain-
control returns even if the brain is re-inserted upside-down or rotated 180° (try doing this with 
a robot’s CPU!). This robustness of function is particularly remarkable given that the brain is 
clearly much more than a relay station between the two halves the animal, but instead plays an 
integrative role in selecting appropriate patterns of peripheral motor acts. 
4.1 Precambrian trace-makers revisited
We are now in a position to reconsider the ‘meander’ control system of the model 
Precambrian trace-makers in the light of this evidence concerning the evolution and function of 
the ‘archaic brain’. Recall that the core components of the meander generator, the thigmotaxis 
and phobotaxis reactions, are reflexive mechanisms associated with peripheral sensors.  
However, a further crucial part of the control system is the component that determines which 
side of the body is actively controlling the motor system, or that switches control from one set 
of peripheral mechanisms to another (strophotaxis).  As noted above, for Koopowitz and 
Keenan, the flatworm brain, with its networks of decussating neurons, is primarily a 
mechanism that prevents the two sides of the body “from engaging in contradictory activities”.  
It is possible to speculate, then, that this might also have been true of the nervous systems of 
the early, meandering fossil makers.  In other words, that the appearance of efficient spiraling 
and meandering foraging trails in the fossil records of the late Ediacaran may mark the point 
where centralized action selection mechanisms had evolved to take control over peripheral 
reflexive systems.
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5 Vertebrate nervous systems
The origin of the vertebrate nervous system is in some respects an unsolved problem in 
evolutionary neurobiology (Northcutt, 2005). Vertebrates belong to the phylum Chordata 
whose members all possess, at some stage in their development, a single, hollow nerve cord, 
called the neural tube, which runs most of the length of the longitudinal body axis. 
Unfortunately, all living protochordates (that is, animals of the chordate phylum that are not
craniates) have relatively simple nervous systems, and only one species, Branchiostoma
(previously known as Amphioxus), has a nervous system that could resemble a transitional 
stage between ancestral chordate and vertebrate. Branchiostoma shows elaborations at the 
anterior end of the neural tube that may be homologous to some regions of the vertebrate brain 
(Lacalli, 1996); however the ‘brain’ of Branchiostoma is tiny, its sensory systems primitive, 
and its behavior very simplified compared with that of living vertebrates. In the modern fauna, 
the most primitive craniate characteristics are found amongst the jawless fish (Agnatha) 
(Northcutt, 1996). Examination of these animals has shown the same gross morphological 
divisions of the nervous system—spinal cord, hindbrain, midbrain, and forebrain—as are 
present in other vertebrate classes. Indeed, impressions of these structures have also been found 
in the fossilized endocasts (casts from the inside of fossil skulls) of ancient agnathans 
(Halstead, 1965). This evidence suggests that a basic ‘ground plan’ for the nervous system is 
shared by all living vertebrate classes, and possibly by all ancestral vertebrates (see Prescott et 
al, 1999; Northcutt, 2002).
The substrate for action selection in a control architecture as complex as the vertebrate 
nervous system is likely to involve many different mechanisms and structures. The following 
brief review is by no means exhaustive but considers a few promising candidates.
5.1 Conflict resolution for clean escape
One of the requirements for effective action selection is timely, sometimes very rapid, decision 
making. Transmission and response times in neural tissue are not negligible so for urgent tasks 
it is important to ensure that time is not lost resolving conflicts with competing behaviors. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest, that for tasks such as defensive escape, special circuitry 
may have evolved in the vertebrate nervous system to provide a very fast override of the 
competition. The giant Mauthner cells (M-cells) found in the brain-stem of most fish and some 
amphibians provide an example of this function (Eaton, Lee, & Foreman, 2001). M-cells are 
known to be involved in the ‘C-start’ escape maneuver—the primary behavior used by many 
species of fish to avoid hazards such as predation. Eaton, Hofve, and Fetcho (1995) have 
argued that the principle role of the M-cell in the brainstem escape circuit may not be to initiate 
the C-start as much as to suppress competing behaviors. This conclusion is supported by 
evidence that removal of the M-cells does not disable the C-start and has only a mild effect on 
the strength or latency of the response. Instead, the fast conduction of the Mauthner giant axon 
(one of the largest in the vertebrates) may be crucial in ensuring that contradictory signals, that 
could otherwise result in fatal errors, do not influence motor output mechanisms. Conservation 
of brain-stem organization across the vertebrate classes suggests that homologous mechanisms 
may play a similar role in the escape behaviors of other vertebrates (Lingenhohl & Friauf, 
1994; Eaton et al., 2001).
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5.2 Fixed priority mechanisms
Many studies of the role of the vertebrate brain in behavioral integration suggest that the 
resolution of conflict problems between the different levels of the neuraxis (spinal cord, hind-
brain, mid-brain, etc.) may be determined by fixed-priority, vertical links. For instance, 
Prescott et al. (1999) have reviewed evidence that the vertebrate defense system can be viewed 
as a set of dissociable layers in which higher levels can suppress or modulate the outputs of 
lower levels using mechanisms somewhat similar to the inhibition and suppression operators 
employed in the subsumption architecture. Fixed-priority mechanisms cannot, however, 
capture the versatility of behavior switching observed between the different behavior systems 
(defense, feeding, reproduction, etc.) found in adult vertebrates. Since dominance relationships 
between behavior systems can fluctuate dramatically with changing circumstances more 
flexible forms of selection are required than can be determined by hard-wiring.
5.3 Reciprocal inhibition
A specific form of neural connectivity, often associated with action selection, is mutual or 
reciprocal inhibition (RI). In networks with recurrent reciprocal inhibition two or more sub-
systems are connected such that each one has an inhibitory link to every other. Such circuits 
make effective action selection mechanisms since the most strongly activated sub-system will 
receive less total inhibition than any of the others; and the recurrent connectivity of the system 
results in positive feedback that rapidly maximizes the activity of this ‘winner’ relative to all 
the other ‘losing’ sub-systems. RI connectivity has been identified in many different areas of 
the vertebrate brain (Windhorst, 1996) and could play a role in conflict resolution at multiple 
levels of the nervous system (Gallistel, 1980). For instance, RI between the ventrolateral 
preoptic (VLPO) nucleus of the hypothalamus and a group of monaminergic brainstem nuclei 
has been found to play a critical role in regulating mammalian sleep-wake behavior (Saper, 
Scammell, & Lu, 2005). VLPO neurons that are primarily active during sleep have direct, 
mutual inhibitory connections with cells in these monaminergic nuclei that fire most rapidly 
during wakefulness; the resulting circuit instantiates a ‘flip-flop switch’ capable of generating 
rapid transitions between arousal states.  A further group of neurons in the lateral hypothalamus 
modulates the stability of this switch which would otherwise be over-sensitive to small 
perturbations.
5.4 Centralized selection mechanisms
Snaith and Holland (1990) have contrasted distributed action selection based on RI with a 
system that employs a specialized, central switching device. They note that to arbitrate between 
n competitors, an RI system with full connectivity requires n(n-1) connections, while adding a 
new competitor requires a further 2n connections. In contrast, a system using a central switch 
requires only 2 connections per competitor (to and from the switch) resulting in 2n connections 
in all. Adding a further unit requires only 2 additional connections. On this comparison, a 
central switching device clearly provides a significant advantage in terms of economy of 
connections costs. Ringo (1991) has pointed out that geometrical factors place important limits 
on the degree of network interconnectivity within the brain. In particular, larger brains cannot 
support the same degree of connectivity as smaller ones—significant increases in brain size (as 
have been seen in vertebrate evolution) must inevitably be accompanied by decreased 
connectivity between non-neighboring brain areas. Since, during awake behavior, functional 
units in different parts of the brain will often be in competition for the same motor resources, 
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the requirement of lower connectivity with increased brain-size would appear to favor selection 
architectures with lower connectional costs than RI.  Below I consider two brain sub-systems—
the basal ganglia and the medial reticular formation—that may have evolved as centralized 
selection mechanisms to meet this need. 
Figure 9. Systems for action selection in the vertebrate brain: A saggital slice through the rat brain 
illustrating the locations of medial core of the reticular formation (mRF), the basal ganglia (Striatum, 
Pal—Pallidum, SNr—Substantia Nigra, STN—subthalamic nucleus), and the superior colliculus (SC).
5.4.1 The basal ganglia
The principle components of the basal ganglia include the striatum and pallidum in the base of 
the vertebrate forebrain, and the substantia nigra in the midbrain.  These structures (or 
homologous nuclei) are found in the nervous systems of all classes of jawed vertebrates and 
possibly in all vertebrates (Northcutt, 1994; Medina & Reiner, 1995). The striatum, in 
particular, is a substantial structure in all vertebrate brains and occupies a roughly similar 
proportion of forebrain volume in all the vertebrate classes (Hodos, 1982; Finlay & Darlington, 
1995). The proposal that the basal ganglia are involved in action selection is based on an 
emerging consensus amongst neuroscientists that a key function of these structures is to enable 
desired actions and to inhibit undesired, potentially competing, actions (e.g. Chevalier & 
Deniau, 1990; Mink & Thach, 1993; Groenewegen, Wright, & Beijer, 1996; Redgrave, 
Prescott, & Gurney, 1999; Grillner, Hellgren, Menard, Saitoh, & Wikstrom, 2005). The 
following provides a brief summary of the proposed functional architecture, a full account of 
this view has been provided elsewhere (Prescott et al., 1999; Redgrave et al., 1999).
Neural signals that may represent ‘requests for access’ to the motor system are 
continuously projected to the striatum, which is the principle basal ganglia input nucleus, from 
relevant functional sub-systems in both the brainstem and forebrain of the animal. Afferents 
from a wide range of sensory and motivational systems also arrive at striatal input neurons. 
This connectivity should allow both extrinsic and intrinsic motivating factors to influencing the 
strength of rival bids. The level of activity in different populations of striatal neurons 
(channels) may then form a “common currency” in which competing requests for actuating 
systems can be effectively compared. The main output centers of the basal ganglia (parts of the 
substantia nigra and pallidum) are tonically active and direct a continuous flow of inhibition at 
neural centers throughout the brain that either directly or indirectly generate movement. This 
tonic inhibition appears to place a powerful brake on these movement systems such that the 
basal ganglia seem to hold a ‘veto’ over all voluntary movement.  Intrinsic basal ganglia 
circuitry, together with feedback loops via the thalamus, appears to be suitably configured to 
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resolve the selection competition between multiple active channels and selectively disinhibit
winning action sub-systems whilst maintaining or increasing inhibition on competing channels. 
A large number of computational models, at different levels of abstraction, have now 
examined the functional capabilities of basal ganglia circuits from the perspective of action 
selection (see Prescott, Gurney, & Redgrave, 2002; Gurney, Prescott, Wickens, & Redgrave, 
2004 for reviews). One of these models has also been instantiated, and demonstrated to be 
effective, within the control architecture of a small mobile robot (Montes Gonzalez, Prescott, 
Gurney, Humphries, & Redgrave, 2000; Prescott, Gonzalez, Humphries, Gurney, & Redgrave,
2006). Collectively, these models lend considerable support to the hypothesis that the basal 
ganglia are suitably connected and configured to serve as an array of specialized central 
switching devices that could provide effective conflict resolution with economical 
interconnectivity.
5.4.2 The medial reticular formation
Studies of infants rats in whom the basal ganglia are not yet developed (see, e.g. 
Berridge, 1994), and in decerebrate animals in which the forebrain and much of the midbrain 
have been removed (Woods, 1964; Lovick, 1972; Berntson & Micco, 1976), indicate that, 
below the basal ganglia, there is a brainstem substrate for selection that can provide some basic 
behavioral switching while the adult architecture is developing or when it is damaged or 
incapacitated. A likely locus for this mechanism is in the medial core of the brainstem reticular 
formation (mRF) (Scheibel & Scheibel, 1967; Scheibel, 1984; Humphries, Gurney, & Prescott, 
In Press).  The mRF appears to fulfill the connectional requirements of a centralized selection 
system in that it receives afferent input from all of the body’s external and internal sensory 
systems and projects outputs to the cranial nerves that control movement of the face and to 
spinal neurons that command limb control and locomotion pattern generation. The intrinsic 
circuitry of the mRF appears to be configured as a set of clusters, that the Scheibels (1967) 
analogized with “a stack of poker chips”. In each cluster there are two main neural populations: 
the first consists of large projection neurons, having excitatory outputs, that branch to targets in 
the spinal cord and midbrain as well as to other cluster within the mRF; the second population 
consists of inter-neurons that project inhibitory outputs entirely within the same cluster.   
Humphries, Gurney, & Prescott (2005) have shown that the structure generated by this pattern 
of intrinsic connectivity is that of a ‘small-world’ network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998)—mRF 
neurons are more locally inter-connected, and linked by shorter paths, than networks with the 
same number connections arranged in random or uniform configurations. This interesting 
finding implies certain properties, shared by other small-world networks, such as rapid cross-
network synchronization and persistent activity, that would be consistent with an action 
selection role.  
How, then, might the mRF operate as an action selection substrate? Humphries et al. (in 
press) have proposed that activity in individual clusters may represent sub-actions—component 
parts of a coherent behavior. Thus the expression of a behavior should involve the simultaneous 
activation of clusters representing compatible sub-actions and inhibition of clusters 
representing incompatible ones. Simulation of model mRF circuits indicates that the pattern of 
connectivity described above—between cluster excitation and within cluster inhibition—does 
have the potential to implement such a mechanism (Humphries et al., in press).  If this proves 
to be an appropriate model of the mRF it also suggests that there is a brainstem substrate for 
action selection that is quite different from either the bank of centralized disinhibitory switches 
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identified in the basal ganglia, or the notion of distributed switching circuits utilizing RI.  
Future modeling work will hopefully tease out what advantages and disadvantages this novel 
form of action selection mechanism may convey.
Both the basal ganglia and the reticular formation lie in central positions along the 
vertebrate main neuraxis (see figure 5), and have been described collectively as forming the 
brain’s ‘centrencephalic core’—identified by a number of neurobiologists as playing a key role 
in the integration of behavior (see Prescott et al., 1999 for review). The mRF is a major target 
of basal ganglia output via a pathway involving the pedunculopontine nucleus and, in the intact 
adult brain, it is likely that both systems co-operate to determine what form of behavior is 
expressed at a given time. The relationship between the two systems may combine aspects of 
layered (subsumption-like) and hierarchical decomposition of control. Layered, since 
developmental and decerebrate studies suggest that the mRF can operate, to some degree, 
without modulation from higher brain structures (including the basal ganglia). Hierarchical 
since, if there is validity in the conjecture that the mRF provides a sub-action decomposition of 
behavior, patterns of innate behavior could then be selected “in toto” by focal disinhibition 
from the basal ganglia. 
5.5 The role of the cortex in action selection
The evolution of mammals saw a substantial increase in the role of the forebrain in action 
specification and control (Butler & Hodos, 1996) largely supplementing, rather than replacing, 
the functionality of motor systems lower down the neuraxis. The mammalian brain 
consequently possesses a complex layered control architecture providing multiple levels of 
sensorimotor competence (Prescott et al., 1999).  Both cortical and sub-cortical motor systems 
form action selection ‘loops’ via the basal ganglia (McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet, & 
Redgrave, 2005) providing the option to choose between brainstem systems that provide a 
rapid response to immediate contingencies, and cortical systems that provide more 
sophisticated adjudication between alternatives, taking greater account of context, past 
experiences, and future opportunities.  Experiments with mammals, such as rats and cats, in 
which the cerebral cortex has been completely removed (see Gallistel, 1980; Wishaw, 1990), 
show that such radical surgery leaves intact the capacity to generate motivated, and integrated 
behavioral sequences.  Decorticate animals lack skilled motor control, are impaired in various 
learning tasks, and appear more stimulus-bound than control animals, yet they still eat, drink, 
and groom under appropriate motivational and stimulus conditions, and display many aspects 
of normal social and sexual behavior.  To this extent then, the cortex does not appear to be a 
critical locus for behavioral integration at least with respect to these animals’ basic repertoire of 
species-typical acts.  The mammalian prefrontal cortex, which has long been identified with a 
general role in ‘executive function’ (see e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001), forms similar closed-loop 
circuits with the basal ganglia to motor cortical areas more directly associated with the control 
of movement (Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, In press). This finding, suggests that the basal ganglia 
selection mechanisms have been appropriated for use in more cognitive tasks involving, for 
example, planning, or the selection and maintenance of working memory representations.  
Areas of prefrontal cortex also act to process reward information, to predict expected outcomes, 
to monitor performance and catch errors, to evalute cost/benefit trade-offs, and to analyse 
context (Krawczyk, 2002; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; 
Rushworth et al., 2005; Schall, Stuphorn, & Brown, 2002).  In other words, whilst the action 
Prescott Evolution of Action Selection Mechanisms 22
selection machinery may be primarily sub-cortical, the cortex provides a much enriched 
capacity to ensure that the most appropriate actions are selected. 
Intrinsic competitive mechanisms within specific cortical areas (Fransen & Lansner, 1998), 
and forward and back projections between different cortical domains (Duncan, Humphreys, & 
Ward, 1997; Renart, Parga, & Rolls, 1999), may also contribute to the preference of some 
courses of action over others.  For instance, it is likely that cortical systems have an attractor 
dynamics that limits the number of alternative courses of action that are available at a given 
moment (Cisek, in press; Lukashin, Amirikian, Mozhaev, Wilcox, & Georgopoulos, 1996; 
Weber, Wermter, & Elshaw, 2006).  Similarly, selective attention, arising as the result of 
distributed competitive processes, may help to narrow the range of options available (Deco & 
Rolls, 2005; Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997).  How these emergent selection processes 
interact with the more specialized selection circuits in substrates such as the basal ganglia 
remains to be fully understood.
6 Conclusions—‘forced moves’ and ‘good tricks’ in the evolution of 
action selection
I have provided a brief review of the neural substrate of action selection in a small number of 
living animal groups. The particular animals considered were chosen for their proximity to an 
evolutionary trajectory leading from the very first nervous systems to those of the vertebrate 
class to which we ourselves belong. Of course, this path leaves out the vast majority of living 
animals including all the advanced protostome invertebrate classes, such as the insects, that 
have provided valuable inspiration to recent research in robotics (see e.g. Webb & Consi, 
2001). The wider study of the evolutionary neurobiology of both protostome and deuterostome 
phyla should provide evidence of convergence and divergence in control system design that 
will help in the search for more evolutionary ‘forced moves’ and ‘good tricks’.  The literature 
on behavioral choice in the nervous systems of simple molluscan and crustacean invertebrates 
is particularly relevant to this search (for reviews see Davis, 1979; Kovac & Davis, 1980; 
Kristan & Shaw, 1997; Kupfermann & Weiss, 2001; Elliott & Susswein, 2002; Esch & Kristan, 
2002). Neuroethological investigations in such animals have demonstrated several principles 
consistent with the analysis presented here: (i) that distinct behaviors may involve overlapping 
neural substrates; (ii) that the control of behavior is often hierarchically organized (such that 
when the pre-conditions for two or more behaviors are simultaneously met, particular responses 
are likely to take precedence); (iii) that some neurons (or neuron populations) play specific 
roles in behavior switching (sometimes characterized as ‘command’ or ‘higher-order’ neurons) 
(iv) that the activation of motor outputs relevant to one behavior is often accompanied by 
inhibition of competing outputs; and (v) that selection may often involve di-synaptic inhibitory 
pathways (i.e. disinhibition). Finally, although the current review has also focused on neural 
circuits, it is important to note that diffuse regulatory mechanisms, such as the endocrine 
system8, can play an important role in action selection (see, e.g. Kandel, Krasne, Strumwasser, 
& Truman, 1979; Schmitt, 1984; Jung & Scheller, 1991; Kupfermann & Weiss, 2001). 
Despite the limitations noted above, I believe that a number of conclusions can be 
drawn from the findings surveyed.
                                                     
8
 It is interesting to note in this regard, that the first nerve cells may have been neurosecretory, in other words, 
diffuse chemical signaling may have preceded electrical conduction in the evolution of animal control systems 
(Horridge, 1968; Mackie, 1990).
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First, the investigation of cnidarian nervous systems shows that many forms of 
behavioral integration can be achieved in complex multi-celled animals in the relative absence 
of centralized nervous system structures. The elegance of these natural solutions is only just 
beginning to be matched by those developed for distributed robot control systems, indeed, I 
suspect that the study of cnidarian nervous systems and behavior could provide some ‘good 
tricks’ for the design of future ‘minimalist’ mobile robots. 
Second, the review of trace-fossil data, and of the functional architecture of flatworm 
nervous systems suggests that the evolution of centralized selection mechanisms in the archaic 
brain may have been a ‘forced move’ required to maintain behavioral coherence in a 
bilaterally-organized animal. The value of fusing centralized action selection with distributed, 
layered, or behavior-based control has been recognized in the design of a number of robot 
control architectures (Rosenblatt, 1997; Utete, Barshan, & Ayrulu, 1999; Rosenblatt, 2000; 
Yavuz & Bradshaw, 2002; DeSouza & Kak, 2004). More generally, it seems likely that the 
design of artificial control systems could benefit from the use of similar centralized conflict 
resolution systems because of the advantages that this form of modularity can confer (see 
Prescott et al., 1999; Bryson, 2000).
Finally, my review of the neural substrate of action selection in vertebrates has 
identified a number of candidate mechanisms that may be instantiated in their neural circuitry. 
This evidence suggests the existence of multiple substrates for action selection in the vertebrate 
nervous system. A key proposal, derived from neurobiological evidence but backed-up by 
theoretical results from computational models, is that vertebrates exploit specialized selection 
circuitry found in groups of centralized brain structures—the medial core of the reticular 
formation and the basal ganglia. It seems possible that the connectional economy of this 
centralized design, which can act to resolve competitions between functional sub-systems 
distributed widely in the brain, may be one the reasons that the vertebrate nervous system has 
scaled successfully with the evolution of animals of larger brain and body size. The design of 
control systems for robots with multiple actuator sub-systems should benefit from a better 
understanding of how these different elements of the vertebrate nervous system co-operate to 
maintain behavioral coherence.
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